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The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities:
A Love/Hate Relationship
Jane C. Ginsburg*
Copyrightformalities-conditionsprecedent to the existence or enforcement of
copyright, such as provision of information about works of authorship that will put
the public on notice as to a work's protected status and its copyright ownership, or
deposit of copies of the work for the national libraryor other centralauthority, or
local manufacture of copies of works offoreign origin-haveperformed a variety
offunctions in the history of U.S. copyright. Perhapsof most practicalimportance
today, formalitiespredicate to the existence or enforcement of copyright can serve
to shield large copyright owners who routinely comply with formalitiesfrom the
infringement claims of smaller copyright owners, particularly individual authors,
who may lack the information or resources systematically to register and deposit
their works.
This Article will first define 'formalities," and then will consider their
conceptualfoundations. Next, it will examine the U.S. experience with formalities,
from the first copyright statute of 1790 to the present. Finally, it will consider
whether and how the beneficial, information-providingrole offormalities might be
achieved, without engendering forfeitures of protection or posing practical
impediments to meaningful enforcement of copyright.

* Morton L. Janklow Professor of literary and artistic property law, Columbia University
School of Law. This Article is based in part on a report to the Association Litt6raire et Artistique
Internationale (ALAI) at its June 17, 2009 Congress; the report was in turn based in part on a lecture
given April 20, 2009 at the University of Rome 1 La Sapienza, "Protezione del pubblico o trappola per
gli autori, le formalith nella concezione e nella pratica del diritto d'autore." I am grateful to Professors
Laura Moscati and Paolo Spada for their comments. Thanks also to David Carson, Esq. and to
Professors Lionel Bently, Jessica Litman, R. Anthony Reese, and to Professors Joanna Manning and
David Williams and the participants in the University of Auckland Faculty of Law faculty workshop.
Many thanks for research assistance to Mark Musico, Columbia Law School Class of 2011.
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INTRODUCTION
Given calls for a return of copyright formalities, such as those expressed in some
recent copyright scholarship,' a reality check might be in order. The United States
has had de jure or de facto mandatory copyright formalities for over 200 years.
Does our experience serve as an inspiration or as a cautionary tale?
Copyright formalities-conditions precedent to the existence or enforcement of
copyright, such as provision of information about works of authorship that will put
the public on notice as to a work's protected status and its copyright ownership, or
deposit of copies of the work for the national library or other central authority, or
local manufacture of copies of works of foreign origin-have performed (or are
thought to have performed) a variety of functions in U.S. copyright history. First,
formalities that condition the existence or enforcement of copyright on supplying
information about works of authorship should enable effective title searching, thus
furthering the economic interests both of copyright owners and of potential

1. See Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the digital era: An obstacle or opportunity?
(proceedings of the ALAI Annual Congress, London, England, June 14-17, 2009), available at
https://www.alai2009.org/programme.aspx; see also sources cited, infra note 9.
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exploiters. 2 Second, copyright-constitutive formalities, principally notice of
copyright, but also at various times deposit, registration and renewal, erect a barrier
to the existence of protection, concomitantly casting into the public domain
published works that fail to comply. These formalities thus (at least in theory) have
divided works of perceived economic significance worth the effort of compliance
from the mass of other creations, leaving the latter free for others to exploit. Third,
formalities with whose compliance protection depends entail additional results,
probably intended, and in any event certainly foreseeable. U.S. manufacturing
requirements, introduced when the U.S. at last extended copyright to works of
foreign origin,3 served not only local labor interests, but also consigned to the
public domain foreign works whose authors were unaware that U.S. protection for
works of foreign creators required the employment of local printers and artisans.
Thus, the international copyright protection that Congress belatedly gave with one
hand, it may have placed substantially out of reach with the other. 4 Finally, and
perhaps of most practical importance today, formalities predicate to the existence or
enforcement of copyright can serve to shield large copyright owners who routinely
comply with formalities from the infringement claims of smaller copyright owners,
particularly individual authors, who may lack the information or resources
systematically to register and deposit their works.
Confiscatory formalities, long lamented in U.S. copyright commentary,5 have
now garnered favor in some quarters, particularly with respect to exploitations on
the Internet. One hundred years after the 1908 Berlin Act of the Beme Convention
confirmed the automatic vesting of international copyright by forbidding the
imposition of copyright-constitutive or enforcement-predicate formalities on
foreign Berne member works, most countries have also ceased to require
compliance by local authors as well. With formality-free initial protection, any
2. Formalities thus can serve to alleviate the transaction costs of what Professor Molly van
Houweling has called "atomistic copyright." See Molly Shaffer van Houweling, Author Autonomy and
Atomism in Copyright Law 55-56 (Aug. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1422016).
3. An act to amend title sixty, chapter three, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating
to copyrights, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891), sec. 3 ("Provided,That in the case of a book, photograph, chromo,
or lithograph, the two copies of the same required to be delivered or deposited as above shall be printed
from type set within the limits of the United States, or from places made therefrom, or from negatives,
or from drawings on stone made within the limits of the United States, or from transfers made
therefrom.").
4. The manufacturing clause applied to all books, periodicals, lithographs and photo-engravings,
including those by U.S. authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 15 (1909 Act, repealed 1976). For a summary of the
complexities of the 1891 and 1909 Act manufacturing clauses, starkly illustrating the many pitfalls for
foreign, and even some domestic, authors, see R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW 153-

61 (Houghton Mifflin 1912). See also Elizabeth K. Dunne, Study No. 20, Deposit ofCopyrighted Works
(1960), reprinted in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 409, 425 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed., 1960) ("It was found
almost impossible for foreign authors, writing in a foreign language, to complete negotiations for the
publication of an American edition of their work (as required by the manufacturing clause) prior to
publication abroad.").
5. See, e.g., Irwin Karp, A Future Without Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 521
(1995); Arthur Levine, The End of Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553 (1995); Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright From Formalities, 13
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 (1995).
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work created, no matter how trivial (so long as minimally "original"), automatically
enjoys enforceable exclusive rights in every country of the Berne Union.
Protection thus "subsists" 6 even for casual communications, and even though the
author may not be a professional creator, and hence may be unaware of or
indifferent to any copyright in her work.7 On the other hand, the Internet has put
vast amounts of formal and informal copyrighted content at the de facto (if not de
jure) disposal of countless users. A clash between users disinclined, or practically
unable, to clear rights, and the subsisting rights of authors may seem inevitable.
The relaxation of formalities is also evoked as a cause of "orphanage" of works:
were registration required, then rights holders might more easily be found.8
Hence the current vogue for "reformalizing copyright," 9 to return to the author
or right holder the burden of asserting claims to copyright, and thereby to enlarge
the public domain with works whose authors do not "care" sufficiently about to
mark off their ownership. 10 In other words, the draconian features of U.S.
formalities, once seen as deplorable, now in some respects are celebrated. Whether
or not a return to the copyright-confiscatory function of formalities is desirable, the
United States' Berne obligations would forbid it from imposing a reformalized
regime on foreign works. Beme's reservation of domestic protection in the country
of origin' 1 would, however, permit the United States to reinstate formalities with
respect to U.S. works. While, as we will see, the U.S. has applied a "two-tier"
approach to certain enforcement-predicate formalities, a return to conditioning the
existence or persistence of copyright on compliance with formalities so
significantly increases the discrimination against local creators as to be politically
problematic. Moreover, given the ease in the digital era with which the country of
origin can be manipulated, 12 it is not even clear that a two-tier regime will in fact
burden any but the least informed and least affluent local creators.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship
fixed. . . ").
7. One may, however, dispute the indifference of non-professional authors to the subsistence of
copyright in their works. To the extent that the use of Creative Commons icons serves as a guide, most
users affix icons denoting a reservation of copyright control over their works, for example, with over
three-quarters of persons posting photographs to Flickr adopting the "non commercial" and/or "no
derivative works" directions. See Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/creativecommons/ (last visited Feb. 23,
2010).
8. David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009); Lawrence
Lessig, Op-Ed., Little Orphan Artworks, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008, at A23. See also WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS, THIRTEENTH SESSION, SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS FOR COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, Doc. SCCR/13/2 4-6 (Nov. 9, 2005) (discussing
relationship of formalities to orphan works).

9. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009); James
Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2005); Christopher Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 484 (2004).
10. But see supranote 7.
11. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 5(3) [hereinafter Berne Cony.] ("Protection in the country of
origin is governed by domestic law.").
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "United States work" for purposes of § 411 -pre-suit
registration requirement; if the work is first published outside the U.S. in another Berne member State
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This Article will first further define "formalities," and then will consider their
conceptual foundations. Next, it will examine the U.S. experience with formalities,
from the first copyright statute of 1790 to the present. Finally, it will consider
whether and how the beneficial, information-providing role of formalities might be
achieved, without engendering forfeitures of protection or posing practical
impediments to meaningful enforcement of copyright.
I. FORMALITIES IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE: THEORY
3

A. WHAT ARE, AND ARE NOT, "FORMALITIES"?1

In the sense of the Berne Convention, the formalities that article 5(2) prohibits
member States from imposing on foreign authors include "everything which must
be complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his
work may come into existence." 14 Thus requirements such as registration, the
deposit or filing of copies, the payment of fees, or the making of declarations or
affixing notices to copies of the work, may not be made mandatory preconditions to
protection. But State-imposed preconditions on the coming-into-being of the
author's rights represent only part of the Berne-targeted formalities. An author
may be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce her rights unless she complies
with a variety of prerequisites to suit. Hence the addition by the 1908 Berlin Act of
the word "exercise," so that then-article 4(2) (now article 5(2)) read: "The
15
enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality."
This wording was designed to cover any provision in member-State law that, as
distinct from making the recognition of an author's rights contingent upon
compliance with some formality, made the bringing of proceedings to enforce these
rights subject to a formality (perhaps even the same ones as required for the
existence of protection). For example, the obligation the U.S. Copyright Act
imposed on authors to register their works with the Copyright Office as a
prerequisite to initiating an infringement action was deemed inconsistent with the
article 5(2) prohibition on subjecting the exercise of rights to compliance with
formalities. 16
and not simultaneously published in the U.S., it is not a "U.S. work"); see also Berne Conv., supra note
11, at art. 3(4) (definition of country of origin; "simultaneous" publication occurs within thirty days of
first publication).
13. Portions of this section have been adapted from SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND,

6.102-6.105 (2006).
See Actes de la Confirence internationalepour la protection des droits d'auteur rdunie d
14.
Berne du 8 au 19 Septembre 1884 43 (1884), discussed in RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13,
6.102 (2006).
Berne Conv. art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27, 943 U.S.T.S. 178.
15.
16. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
The 1988 Berne Convention
reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 569-74 (1986).
Implementation Act accordingly lifted the requirement for non-U.S. Berne works, but retained it for
U.S. works. See Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kemochan, 102 Years Later: The US Joins the Berne

316

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[33:3

Nonetheless, not every record-keeping or even litigation-related obligation a
State imposes should be considered a Berne-banned "formality." For example,
Berne does not require the suspension of local rules of evidence or procedure
applicable to all judicial proceedings; it targets only copyright-specific measures.17
Thus, a foreign copyright holder cannot assert that article 5(2) dispenses her from
paying court fees that attach to the filing of any kind of claim, but she may object
to payment of a fee imposed only on the bringing of a copyright action.
It is also necessary to distinguish between local rules that condition the validity
or scope of a grant of rights on the formalization of an agreement to transfer rights
under copyright and rules that limit the exercise of those rights independently of
their ownership. The first class of rules-which may include such requirements as
that the transfer be in writing, that it be signed by the author and that the scope of
the grant be clearly articulated-are generally designed to protect authors from
ignorant or improvident transfers. 18 The rationale and the effect of this kind of
author-protective formalism are profoundly different from public-protective
formalities, such as notice or registration, or copyright-specific litigation hurdles,
which seek to shield the public from authors' claims. In the former instance, the
formal rules tell us who is entitled to enforce a copyright whose existence the rules
do not call into question. In the latter instance, the formalities limit any copyright
claimant's enforcement, and may destroy the copyright altogether. The difference
between who owns rights under a copyright, and whether a copyright exists or can
be enforced, is crucial to determining whether the obligation under scrutiny is a
Berne-barred "formality." Immediately below, and in Part III, I will address the
consequences of the distinction for the achievement of some of the publicregarding goals of formalities, through the development of a reliable means of titlesearching.
The characterization as "formalities" of three other copyright-pertinent
obligations-recordation of transfers, deposit of copies for the Library of Congress
and conditioning certain remedies on registration-warrants examination. Since
1802, the U.S. has required that transfers of copyright ownership be recorded.

Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 13 (1988).
The Act did not, however, alter the
"incentives" to register, such as according prima facie evidentiary value to registrations made within
five years of publication, and conditioning the availability of statutory damages and attorneys fees on
registration before the occurrence of the infringement, or within three months of publication, 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(c), 412. See S. REP. No. 100-352, at 14-15 (1988) ("While those provisions substantially enhance
the relief available to the proprietor of a registered work, they do not condition the availability of all
meaningful relief on registration, and therefore are not inconsistent with Berne.").
17.

See, e.g., CLAUDE MASOUYt, WIPO GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION,

5.5 (1978); U.S.

Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong. 72 (1985) (statement of Donald C. Curran, the
Assoc. Librarian of Congress and Acting Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office).
18. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (transfers of exclusive rights require a writing signed by the
grantor); Code de la propri6t6 intellectuelle Art. L131-2 (Fr.) ("The performance, publishing and
audiovisual production contracts defined in this Title shall be in writing."); Code de la propri6t6
intellectuelle art. L131-3 (Fr.) ("Transfer of authors' rights shall be subject to each of the assigned rights
being separately mentioned in the instrument of assignment and the field of exploitation of the assigned
rights being defined as to its scope and purpose, as to place and as to duration.").
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Most enactments of this requirement have not made it a condition to enforcement
of the copyright; rather, the penalty for failure to record has been invalidity of the
transfer in the event of a subsequent bona fide purchase, which the later transferee
does record.19 Because this obligation addresses who may assert copyright
ownership, rather than whether the copyright exists or may be enforced, a general
recordation requirement, carrying the same sanctions as those accompanying duties
to record other kinds of property, for example, title to land,20 would not seem
inconsistent with Berne article 5(2).
By contrast, making recordation a prerequisite to suit, as the U.S. briefly did
between the implementation of the 1976 Copyright Act and the enactment in 1988
of amendments to conform to Berne Convention minima, 21 presents a more
difficult question. Such a prerequisite does condition the exercise of copyright on
compliance with an obligation to supply information to a government authority.
But, as indicated earlier, a "formality" is copyright-specific. If recordation of
transfers of title were a prerequisite to assertion of property rights in general, then
one might contend that a recordation requirement should be viewed no differently
than, for example, general court costs (as opposed to special copyright litigation
fees), which we have already posited are Berne-permissible.
If, however,
recordation of title is not generally mandated, a copyright recordation prerequisite
might still survive Berne scrutiny, on the ground that the requirement concerns who
may exercise the rights, rather than whether they may be enforced at all.
The obligation to deposit copies for the national library does not violate the
Berne prohibition, so long as the penalty for failure to deposit is not tied to the
existence or enforcement of copyright. Berne does not prevent member States from
requiring authors to subsidize a member State's national library by in effect taxing
the local publication of foreign authors' works; thus, a member State may demand
deposit and may impose fines for failure to comply, so long as any sanctions do not
compromise the existence or enforceability of the copyright.
Finally, conditioning certain remedies on registration of the work 22 may be
problematic. Arguably, so long as a Berne member State leaves basic claims for
injunctive relief and statutory damages unencumbered by formalities, it may limit
the availability of enhanced remedies, such as statutory damages, to compliance
with registration or other obligations. 23 However, "the difference between a
19. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976); Act of Feb. 3, 1831,
ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (amended 1870); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (repealed
1909).
20. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2006) ("Every such conveyance [of real
property] not so recorded is void as against any person who subsequently purchases ... the same real
property . . . in good faith and for a valuable consideration, from the same vendor or assignor, his
distributees or devisees, and whose conveyance, contract or assignment is first duly recorded . . .");
Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1989) (purchaser who first recorded the sale of real property
prevails against previous purchaser who did not record).
See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1976) (repealed 1988).
21.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (pre-infringement registration of work a prerequisite to obtaining
statutory damages and attorneys fees), discussed infra Part II.C.2.
23.

See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE

BERNE CONVENTION, reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 572-74 (1986). See also Football
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permissible conditioning of an enhanced remedy, and an impermissible
conditioning of an effective remedy may not always be apparent, thus making the
distinction a delicate one in practice." 24
B.

CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS

This Section will set the question of copyright formalities on the broader stage
of copyright theory, if only to overturn that platform by examining the history of
copyright formalities. Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, commentators
have articulated two general concepts of copyright, one founded in natural property
rights, the other based on a State grant of monopoly. For example, in 1838,
Charles-Augustin Renouard, author of one of the first French copyright treatises,
articulated two opposing philosophies of copyright. According to one, grounded in
natural rights conceptions of property, authors are the absolute owners of their
work, both before and after publication. Their property right is, like all other
property rights, transmissible, perpetual and inviolable. According to the other,
social contract-based, system of copyright thought, authors are:
[W]orkers and not property owners; if the laws ensure them exclusive exploitation of
their works, it is by virtue of a positive grant of civil law and of a tacit contract which,
at the moment of publication, intervenes between the public and the author. It is by
the establishment of a privilege, created as a legitimate and fair compensation, that the
full and free exploitation of a published work is forbidden to all persons composing
the public. 25
From these opposing bases for copyright, different attitudes towards formalities
might follow. If copyright is essentially a government grant, it might well come
with conditions. For example, requiring the author to affix a notice of copyright, or
to register and deposit copies of the work with a government agency before the
right will be recognized or enforced, is fully consistent with a social-contractual
view of copyright. Imposition of formalities thus would reflect the premise that
creating the work does not alone justify protection: copyright is a quid pro quo,
and it is the author's burden properly to assert her rights; should she fail to keep her
end of the bargain, the innocent public should not be liable for unauthorized

Ass'n. Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (exemption of
foreign works from pre-suit registration obligation does not extend to prerequisites to obtaining statutory
damages; the latter registration obligation does not violate the Berne Convention or the TRIPs Accord:
"The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that Section 412 and other provisions of the Copyright Act
'do not condition the availability of all meaningful relief on registration, and therefore are not
inconsistent with Berne.' S. REP. No. 100-352, at 14-15."; in any event, the Beme Convention and
TRIPs are not self-executing in the US); Elsevier BV v. Unitedhealth Group Inc., No 09 Civ.
2124(WHP), 2010 WL 150167 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010) (dismissing challenge to § 412 because Berne
Convention not self-executing).
24. RICKETSON AND GINSBURG, supra note 13, at $ 6.108.
25. Charles-Augustin Renouard, Thgorie des droits des auteurs sur les produits de leur
intelligence, 5 REVUE DE LA LtGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 241, 242 (Oct. 1836-Mar. 1837); see
also AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 1015 (1899) (distinguishing between concepts of copyright as a property right, and as a "privilege").
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exploitations. Formalities thus make free copying the default position, and that
initial stance should not vary unless the author undertakes to warn the world of her
claims. So characterized, formalities clash with the concept that copyright springs
from the creative act. If copyright is a natural property right in the fruits of the
author's intellectual labor, then copyright is born with the work, and no further
action should be necessary to confer or confirm the right. Hence, a natural property
rights conception of copyright should in theory eschew formalities. 26
Such tidy coherence may be theoretically satisfying, but it is also substantially
anachronistic. In historical context, the opposition of natural rights and social
contract (State-granted monopoly) concepts was much less sharp. By the same
token, the role of formalities as exemplifying one or another concept reflects
subsequent rationalizations more than contemporary experience. Neither at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, with the Statute of Anne, nor towards its end,
with the U.S. Constitution's Copyright Clause or the first U.S. copyright statute,
did lawmakers set out to conceptualize copyright exclusively as a natural right, or
only as a conditional State grant, or for that matter to adopt any overriding theory
of copyright. In the case of the Statute of Anne, the vesting of rights in authors
rewarded their intellectual labor, 27 and the conditioning of an additional term of
protection on the author's remaining alive, 28 further demonstrates the Act's focus
on the rights of authorship. But the statute also adopted the regulatory framework
established under the 1662 Licensing Act, including registration with the Stationers
Company and deposit of copies of books with designated libraries. 29 Arguably,
Parliament retained the bureaucratic aspects of the pre-copyright printing privileges
not because its Members carefully conceptualized the nature of copyright, but
because the prior system was known and had worked.30 In the case of the early
26. Benjamin Kaplan, Study No. 17, The Registration of Copyright (1958), in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, at 325, 366 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed., 1960) ("Those for whom copyright is a
'natural' right have regarded formalities as repugnant to such a right and therefore offensive in their
nature; while those who think of copyright as a State-granted, limited 'monopoly' have tended to look
upon formalities as somehow the proper or even the necessary accompaniment of the grant."); see also
SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY,

27.

f 3.25-3.26 (2008).

Laura Moscati, Un "Memorandum " di John Locke tra Censorship e Copyright, LXXVI

RIVISTA DI STORIA DEL DIRITTO ITALIANO, 2003, at 69-89 (demonstrating a link between Locke's

general theory of property rights and his expression of literary property rights, subsequently captured in
the Statute of Anne).
28. The last sentence of the Statute of Anne (§ 11) provides: "Provided always, That after the
expiration of the said term of fourteen years, the sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall return
to the authors thereof, if they are then living, for another term of fourteen years." The Statute of Anne,
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
29. Id. (providing for pre-publication registration of the book's title with the Stationers Company,
"in such manner as hath been usual"). On registration with the Stationers Company under the 1662
Licensing Act, see, e.g., Michael Treadwell, The Stationers and the Printing Acts at the End of the
Seventeenth Century, in 4 THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN BRITAIN 1557-1695, 755 (John Barnard &
D.F. McKenzie eds., 2002).
30.

See, e.g., JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICs: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF

COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 63 (1994) (the Statute of Anne was generally consistent with past business
practice: "For the trade, the 1710 Act represented a simple continuation of legal and commercial
practices which had developed since the middle of the sixteenth century, but which had been under
challenge in the absence of any statutory authority since 1695.")
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U.S. enactments, many pre-Constitutional state copyright statutes included
preambles with ringing declarations of natural property rights, 3 1 but then copied the
Statute of Anne almost verbatim, including its requirements of registration and
deposit of copies, 32 and even including language almost certainly irrelevant to the
situation of the ex-Colonies. 33 The cut-and-paste character of these statutes belies
any consistent reflection on the nature of copyright.
Indeed, in the U.S., authorities throughout the nineteenth century conveyed
highly mixed messages regarding the nature of copyright and the role of
formalities. While courts (including the Supreme Court) often articulated a rigidly
positivistic concept of copyright, for which strict adherence to formalities formed a
comerstone, 34 treatise writers eloquently insisted on the natural rights of
authorship, generally treating formalities as an administrative afterthought. 35
31. See, e.g., Massachusetts Copyright Statute (1783), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT
(1450-1900), (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds.), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgibin/kleioc/0010/exec/showThumb/%22us_1783d%22/start/%22yes%22 ("[A]s such security [of the
fruits of authors' study and industry] is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more
peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind."); North Carolina
Copyright Statute (1785), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900), (L. Bently & M.
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgiat
available
eds.),
Kretschmer
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showThumb/%22us 1785a%22/start/%22yes%22 ("Whereas nothing is more
strictly a man's own than the fruit of his study . . . ."); see generally Francine Crawford, PreConstitutionalCopyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 11 (1975).
32. Crawford, supra note 31, at 23-24, states that the registration requirement was for evidentiary
purposes-to prove that the claimant was the author or held rights from the author-rather than
constitutive of copyright protection.
33. Id.atl 5-16&n.15a.
34. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 665-667 (1834) (strict compliance with all
statutory formalities held a prerequisite to the vesting of federal copyright protection for published
works); Osgood v. AS Aloe Ins. Co., 83 Fed. 470, 471 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1897) (despite judge's
"disposition much in favor of upholding copyrights, and thus securing to authors what seems to be a
natural right to the rewards of their own literary labors," holding that author "never acquired a valid
copyright" because she failed to fulfill statutory obligations to deposit copies of her book with Library of
Congress before publication and to insert proper notice of copyright on the title-page); see also Clayton
v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872) (inferring that a "daily price quote" could not
be the subject matter of federal copyright protection because its publication was too evanescent to
permit compliance with full range of statutory formalities).
35. See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT in BOOKS,
DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS, LETTERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, ENGRAVINGS AND
SCULPTURE, As ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA; WITH SOME NOTICES OF

THE HISTORY OF LITERARY PROPERTY 1-25, 193-198 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (1847)
(Introduction-Theory of the Rights of Authors; copyright founded in "general principles ofjustice and
right"), 193-98 (Chapter VI: Of the Statute Requisites for a Valid Copyright); EATON S. DRONE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE

UNITED STATES 1-20, 262-300 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1879) (Origin and nature of Literary
Property, especially p. 13, challenging argument that author's natural rights cease upon publication: "It
is a ridiculous doctrine which recognizes a species of property, and yet pronounces its only use unlawful
and self-destructive"; Statutory Requisites for Securing Copyright) (1879); Stef van Gompel, 'Les
formalitis sont mortes, vive les formalitis! Copyrightformalities and the reasons for their decline in
nineteenth-century Europe', in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT,

(Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently, eds., forthcoming 2010) has observed a similar
pairing of natural rights rhetoric and formalities in nineteenth-century Continental European copyright
systems.
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Similarly, the Judiciary Committee report accompanying the bill that ultimately
became the 1831 copyright amendments, making registration of the work before its
publication an unambiguous prerequisite to the obtaining of federal copyright
protection, nonetheless extolled the author's natural entitlement to a property right:
"If labor and effort in producing what before was not possessed or known will give
title, then the literary man has title, perfect and absolute, and should have his
reward ....

36

But formalities, and the highly restricted view of copyright they ultimately
symbolized, came to dominate the U.S. landscape, particularly following the
Supreme Court's 1834 decision in Wheaton v. Peters.37 The first state and then
federal copyright statutes had included formalities modeled on Statute of Anne, but
it was not inevitable that they be interpreted as constitutive of copyright, as
opposed to predicate to special statutory remedies. Indeed, British authorities since
the eighteenth century had confined the sanction for non-compliance with
registration and deposit requirements to restricting the author's or rightholder's
remedies for copyright infringement to those available at common law." Noncompliance did not endanger the existence of the author's copyright. By contrast,
the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters imposed punctilious compliance, making
39
post-publication copyright a tributary of the many statutory prerequisites.
Different explanations for the centrality of formalities to Wheaton v. Peters'
delimitation of U.S. copyright might be ventured. Given the Framers' suspicion of
restraints on competition, statutory formalities could have been perceived as a
necessary counterweight to the prospect of excessive market power that even a
monopoly limited in time might engender.4 0 The statutory institution and judicial
requirement of strict observance of statutory formalities would suggest that
Congress and the courts were far more fearful of establishing monopolies than
concerned with fostering authorship. The more stringent the formalities, the more
36. H.R. REP. No. 3 (1830), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, available at
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showThumb/%22us_1831 %22/
start/%22yes%22. Professor Oren Bracha, in his commentary on this Committee Report, suggests that
the Committee's fulsome endorsement of authorial property rights reflected the influence of Noah
Webster, a tireless advocate of copyright protection, whose son-on-law, Oliver Ellsworth, wrote the
Committee Report. Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act 1831 (2008), in PRIMARY
SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgibin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22us 1831%22.
37. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); see also Shaffer van Houweling, supra note 2, at 27 (citing B.
ZORINA KAHN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION 245 (2005) (18% of copyright cases from 1790-

1909 concerned abandonment or forfeiture of copyright for-often minor-failures to comply with
formalities)).
38. See Beckford v. Hood, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.); see also Kaplan, supra note 26, at
327-35 (providing general survey of English case law on formalities).
39. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 663-64, ("No one can deny that when the legislature are
about to vest an exclusive right in an author or inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions
on which such right shall be enjoyed; and that no one can avail himself of such right who does not
substantially comply with the requisitions of the law.").
40. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the
Founders' View of the Copyright Power Grantedto Congress in Article I Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 941 (2003).
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works freely available in the public domain, and the smaller the universe of works
over which exclusive rights could be enforced. 41 An alternative account suggests
that the Wheaton court's embrace of a highly positivistic, formality-defined
approach to copyright was a necessary corollary of the Court's federalism
jurisprudence; after all, Henry Wheaton's assertion that non-compliance with
federal formalities did not bar his common law copyright claims clashed with the
Court's previous rejection of residual state common law intellectual property rights
whose assertion undermined federal control of interstate commerce. 42 Formalityfree copyright was thus a casualty of the Marshall Court's determination to
eliminate barriers to interstate trade and to consolidate federal power. 43 In the light
of the Court's federalism jurisprudence, Justice Joseph Story's perhaps otherwise
surprising alignment with the Wheaton majority becomes more readily
understandable. Although Justice Story was an advocate of broad copyright
protection 44 and may have been sympathetic to Wheaton's common law copyright
claims, he was also "greatly concerned with the development of [the Court's]
jurisprudence as a tool of national power," 45 and had joined or authored the Court's
principal federalism decisions. 46
II. U.S. FORMALITIES IN PRACTICE
Whatever their conceptual foundation, formalities in practice dominated
nineteenth- and twentieth-century U.S. copyright law, their extent and complexity
often proving a trap for the unwary. 47 It is important to emphasize, however, that
those "ensnared" could as well (if perhaps not as often) be exploiters as authors, at
least when incompletely or incorrectly fulfilled formalities misled the user into

41. The extent to which the Framers and their immediate successors were in fact as monopolyphobic as the above account implies is subject to some debate. See, e.g., Thomas B. Nachbar,
ConstructingCopyright's Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 45 (2002) (modem scholars' attribution of
anti-monopoly animus to the framing of early U.S. copyright laws is overstated); Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progressof Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 55-56 (1994)
("very few actually gave much thought to" Congress' power to grant copyright monopolies).
42. See Jane C. Ginsburg, "Une Chose Publique"?: The Author's Domain and the Public
Domain in Early British, Frenchand US CopyrightLaw, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 662-66 (2006).
43. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that Commerce Clause prevailed over any
residual state power to grant patent monopolies on steamboat traffic).
44.

See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED

IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA

1260-74 (W. H. Lyon, Jr. ed., Little, Brown, and Company 1918) (1839);

see generally R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: DistinguishingBetween Infringing and

Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006).

45.

See Craig Joyce, The Story of Wheaton v. Peters:

A Curious Chapter in the History of

Judicature,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, supra note 44, at 36, 41.

46. In addition to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), see, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. 304 (1816).
47. See generally Vincent A. Doyle, George D. Cary, Marjorie McCannon & Barbara A. Ringer,
Study No. 7, Notice of Copyright (1957), 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, at 229; Kaplan, supra
note 26.
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believing the work was unprotected.4 8 Users might draw unreliable conclusions
regarding a work's status because, notwithstanding the legacy of Wheaton v.
Peters, some courts, endeavoring to avoid forfeitures of copyright (particularly
following enactment of the 1909 Act), interpreted (or interpolated into) the statute
some tolerance for substantial, albeit imperfect, compliance. 49
But not all courts were equally forgiving, as others persisted in requiring strict
fulfillment of all statutory conditions. As a result, the legal norm became
increasingly incoherent and unpredictable. The doctrine of "limited publication"
further complicated the situation. Formalities were required for works which had
been, or were about to be, published. Until the 1976 Copyright Act, an
unpublished work, as a chattel, remained the object of formality-free common law
rights. 50 "Unpublished," however, did not mean unexploited or undivulged.
Public performance of a work did not "publish" it, and therefore did not subject it
to formalities, even if the performed work had been widely seen. 5 ' Borrowing
from old English decisions holding that a public performance was not a
"publication," 52 U.S. courts elaborated a parallel universe of "unpublished" works.
The rather strained notion of publication was motivated in large part by courts'
awareness that, were the work to be deemed "published," and had the author not
complied with all applicable federal statutory formalities, the work would go into
the public domain, and all protection, state or federal, would be lost.53
48. See Washingtonian Pub. Co., Inc. v. Pearson, 98 F.2d 245, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1938), rev'd, 306
U.S. 30 (1939) (if failure "promptly" to deposit work following publication does not invalidate
copyright, then the formality becomes "a mere snare for the unwary, who were foolish enough to rely
upon absence of registration as showing absence of copyright." Nonetheless the Court held that the
deposit, which occurred more than two years (published Dec. 1931, deposited Feb. 21, 1933) after
publication, met the statutory standard of promptness).
49. See generally Doyle et al., supra note 47, at 237-49; Kaplan, supra note 26, at 346-5 1.
50. The 1976 Copyright Act abolished the publication threshold for entitlement to federal
copyright, which now "subsists" as of the creation and fixation of the work, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2006).
51.
See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999)
("I Have a Dream" speech technically "unpublished" despite delivery before live audience of thousands,
and television and radio broadcast to millions); see generally William S. Strauss, Study No. 29,
Protectionof Unpublished Works, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supranote 4, at 189.
52. See Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.); Coleman v. Walthen, (1793) 101
Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B.); Morris v. Kelly, (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.).
53. Courts' efforts to avoid forfeitures may also explain the somewhat tortured U.S. case law
relating to sound recordings. See Strauss, supra note 51, at 202-04. In this instance, two different
forfeitures loom, first of the recorded musical composition, and second of the recorded performance.
Under the 1909 Act regime, if sale of phonograms constituted "publication," and the recorded
composition had not previously been published with notice or registered, then the sale of the recording
would cast the composition into the public domain. With regard to the recorded performance, sound
recordings were not included within federal copyright subject matter until 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (1971), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (federal protection for sound
recordings fixed and published with notice on and after Feb. 15, 1972). As a result, were pre-1972
recordings deemed "published," they would have immediately gone into the public domain. Hence the
judicial rulings that the sale and distribution of phonograms did not "publish" the performances, which,
accordingly, remained subject to common law copyright. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of
America, Inc., 4 N.Y.3d 540 (2005); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1955).
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The following chart summarizes the formalities in force under various copyright
laws, from the Statute of Anne and the first Copyright Act to the present.

EVOLUTION OF US FORMALITIES
Formality

(Brit.)
Statute of

1790 Act

1802 Act

1831-1905
Acts
Until 1870:
with district
court; 1870
Act: With
Librarian of
Congress
before
publication;
renewal term
within 6
months before
expiration of
initial term
Precondition to
protection;
failure to
register before
publication cast
work into
public domain

Anne 1710

Registration

Registry of title
of book in
Stationers Co.
register "in
such manner as
hath been
usual" required
pre-publication

Registry of title
of book in
clerk's office
of local federal
district court
required prepublication and
for renewal
term

Registry of title
of book in
clerk's office
of local federal
district court
required prepublication and
for renewal
term

-

sanction
for noncompliance

Statutory
penalties
unavailable,
but copyright
still
enforceable for
remedies in
equity

"No person
shall be entitled
to the benefit of
this act"; may
be ambiguous
whether non
statutory
remedies
available
without

Not entitled to
"benefit of
[1790] Act";
construed in
Wheaton v.
Peters(U S.
1834) to mean
no copyright
protection at all
without total

registration

compliance

Deposit

Nine copies to
designated
libraries

One copy to
secretary of
State within six
months of
publication

One copy to
secretary of
State within six
months of
publication

sanction
for noncompliance

Fines for non
deposit; (1775
Act) Statutory
penalties
unavailable

Not stated

Not entitled to
"benefit of
[1790] Act"
(see above on
registration
non-

Forfeiture of
copyright
(1846 Act);
then
precondition to
copyright

compliance)

(1870 Act)

Two copies to
Library of
Congress
within one
month (1846
Act)/10 days of
pub. (1870 Act)

-
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Formality

1909 Act

1976 Act

1989 (Berne)
Amendments

Registration

With Copyright

With Copyright

With Copyright

Office,

Office,

Office,

accompanying
deposit

accompanying
deposit; now optional
(but see below on
deposit noncompliance)

accompanying
deposit; now optional
(but see below on
deposit noncompliance)

-

sanction
for noncompliance
(cont.)

Prerequisite to
infringement action
(prima facie evidence
of facts stated);
registration within 1
year prior to
expiration of first
term required for
renewal term

Prerequisite to
infringement action
(prima facie evidence
of facts stated);
registration preinfringement
requisite to statutory
damages and
attorneys' fees

Prerequisite to
infringement action US works only;
registration preinfringement
requisite to statutory
damages and
attorneys' fees - all
works

Deposit
(cont.)

Two copies to

Two copies to

Two copies to

Copyright Office

Copyright Office

Copyright Office

"promptly" following

within three months

publication

of publication

within 3 months of
publication

Prerequisite to
infringement suit; if
after demand, no
deposit, fines,
forfeiture of
copyright

Prerequisite to
infringement suit; if
after demand, no
deposit, fines
imposed

Prerequisite to
infringement suit for
US works; if after
demand, no deposit,
fines imposed

(cont.)

sanction
for noncompliance
(cont.)
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Formality

(Brit.)
Statute of
Anne 1710

1790 Act

1802 Act

1831-1905
Acts

Notice

[implicit in
registration and
provision for
public
inspection of
Stationers
Company
registry]

Publication of
record of
registration in
one or more
newspapers for
four weeks
within two
months of
publication,
and, for
renewal term,
during last six
months of first

Same
newspaper
publication
requirements,
plus:
publication of
full record of
registration in
title page of
book or page
immediately
following

On title page of
book or page
immediately
following;
newspaper
notice now
required only
for renewal
term, to be
made within
two months of
renewal date

-

sanction
for noncompliance

[No explicit
provision]

"No person
shall be
entitled to the
benefit of this
Act"

Not entitled to
"benefit of
[1790] Act";
see above

Precondition to
protection;
publication
without notice
cast work into
public domain

Recordation

Entry of
permission to
print in
Stationers Co
register

[No provision]

"Transfer or
assignment of
copyrights" to
be recorded in
clerk's office

Same, with
recordation in
Library of
Congress; Stat.
1, June 30,
1834
(recordation of

sanction
for noncompliance

Statutory
penalties
unavailable

[No provision]

If not recorded
within 60 days
of execution,
void against
subsequent
good faith

If not recorded
within 60 days
of execution,
void against
subsequent
good faith

purchaser

purchaser

term

transfer)

-
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Formality

1909 Act

1976 Act

1989 (Berne)
Amendments

Notice
(cont.)

On title page or page
immediately
following;
newspaper notice no
longer required for
renewal term

Must be affixed to
published copies,
but omission can be
cured within five
years of publication

Optional

-

sanction for
noncompliance
(cont.)

Same, unless notice
omitted from "a
particular copy or
copies"; but no
damages v. innocent
infringer

No forfeiture, but
innocent infringer
defense in theory
possible

Recordation
(cont.)

Assignments to be
recorded within
three or six months
of execution

Forfeiture of
copyright, if
omission of notice
not cured by
registration of work
with Copyright
Office
Any transfer of
copyright or
document pertaining
to copyright

sanction for
noncompliance
(cont.)

Transfer void
against subsequent
good faith purchaser
who recorded
assignment

Prerequisite to suit;
if not filed within a
month, void against
later recording good
faith purchasers who
record first

Same, regarding
later purchasers, but
no longer
prerequisite to suit

-

Any transfer of
copyright or
document pertaining
to copyright
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A. FORMALITIES INPRACTICE: 1909 ACT54

1. Threshold Criterion: Publication.
As indicated earlier, the pivot of the 1909 law was the concept of "publication."
This event was generally the dividing line between common law protection on one
hand and either statutory or no protection on the other. Thus publication with the
prescribed copyright notice obtained statutory copyright, while publication without
such notice placed a work in the public domain. This rule was anchored in the text
of section 9 of the 1909 Act, which provided: "any person entitled thereto by this
Act may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of
copyright required by this Act." 55 The concept of "publication" as used in section
9 developed into a rather technical construct; it was not always coterminous with
the general notion of "making public," nor even with the act that divests the author
of common law rights.
The 1909 Act did not expressly define "publication." This omission was
apparently based on the assumption that to create a general definition of this
concept was too difficult. 56 Section 62, however, provided that in the case of a
work "of which copies are reproduced for sale or distribution," "the 'date of
publication' shall. . . be held to be the earliest date when copies of the first
authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the
proprietor of the copyright or under his authority." 57
Without a coherent concept of "publication" under the 1909 Act, a number of
rather arbitrary distinctions emerged. Among the most well known-and most
important-was the generally accepted rule that the public performance of a spoken
drama did not constitute publication. This rule was established under the pre-1909
law, 58 and was applied by analogy to the exhibition of a motion picture, 59 the
public performance of a musical composition, whether for profit or not,60 and the
oral delivery of a lecture or address, 61 all irrespective of the methods employed,
including radio broadcasting. 62
54.

Subsections A and C are in part adapted from ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG,

COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS, chs. 4 & 5 (7th ed. 2006).

55. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976).
56. Hearingson S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 71 (1906).
57. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88 (repealed 1976). As noted by the
court in Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck, 248 F. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), the section was evidently intended to
fix the date from which the term of copyright should begin to run for such a work, rather than to provide
a general definition of what should constitute publication in all cases.
58. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
59. See, e.g., De Mille v. Casey, 121 Misc. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923).
60. See, e.g., McCarthy v. White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
61. See, e.g., Nutt v. Nat'l Inst., Inc., 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).
62. See, e.g., Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
Under the 1909 Act, considerable uncertainty was also created as to the effect of publication
of a derivative work-such as a reproduction of a work of art, or the motion picture based on a novelon the status of the underlying work on which it is based. Compare Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d
Cir. 1955), with Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). In Batjac Prods. v. GoodTimes
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Because disclosure or communication of a work to another person did not
always amount to "publication" under the 1909 copyright law, restricted
communication of the contents of a work was generally held not to be a publication
of the work. Distribution with limitation by the proprietor of the persons to whom
the work was communicated and of the purpose of the disclosure was long known
as "limited," "restricted" or "private" publication, but was, more accurately, no
"publication" at all. 63 The distinction between limited and general publication
under the 1909 Act was complicated even further by the distinction between
"divestive" and "investive" publication. The former described dissemination that
lost common law copyright; the latter described dissemination, with copyright
notice, that triggered statutory copyright-and, out of concern for forfeitures,
courts more readily found the latter than the former. 64
In sum, although publication triggered statutory formalities, the statutorilyundefined concept of "publication" remained elusive, thus compromising the
prospect of a clear dividing line between works still entitled to common law
protection or qualifying for federal protection on the one hand, and works dedicated
to the public on the other hand. Judicial reluctance to avoid forfeitures, while
inconsistently acted upon, undermined the efficacy of copyright-constitutive
formalities in consigning to the public domain publicly-disclosed works which had
not properly complied with the various statutory formalities. At the outset, then,
one of the signal goals of the U.S. system of formalities was, to say the least,
imperfectly realized.
2. The Notice Requirement

Once a work was deemed "published," the 1909 Act-as did all of its forebears
from 1802-required the placement of a copyright notice in a specified location.65
The required form of notice was set forth in section 18, which (with some minor
exceptions) provided for the word "copyright" (or abbreviation) or the familiar
copyright symbol, the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of publication.
Section 19 mandated the location of the notice-for a book, "upon its title-page or

Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit held that "a common law copyright
in the underlying screenplay does not survive the motion picture's loss of copyright and falls into the
public domain due to a failure to renew the movie's copyright." Bajtak, 160 F.3d at 1225; accord
Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New Horizons Corp., 168 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 1999) (publication of motion
picture The Little Shop of Horrors published as much of the film's screenplay as was disclosed in the
film); Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer, 92 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1114 (1997) (publication of architectural drawings publishes underlying plans); Classic Film
Museum, Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 597 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1979) (publication of motion picture publishes
underlying screenplay to the extent that the movie incorporates the screenplay).
63. See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
64. See, e.g., Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publ'g Co., 27 F.2d 556, 558 (D. Mass. 1928) (sale of
proof copy of magazine to publisher's treasurer held to be investive publication "in so far as the
statutory formalities are concerned").
65. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 19, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079 (repealed 1976). On the history of the
notice requirement, see generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in US Copyright Law: A
History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 148-54 (2007).

330

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[33:3

the page immediately following"; for a periodical, "either upon the title-page or
upon the first page of text of each separate number or under the title heading"; and
for a musical work, "either upon its title-page or the first page of music."66
Some courts were prepared to overlook minor departures from the form and
location requirements of the 1909 Act, provided there was substantial compliance.
This was particularly true if a technically inaccurate corporate or partnership name
was used, but was close enough to the name of the true copyright proprietor (e.g., a
company with identical officers) such that no one could reasonably claim to have
been misled. But other courts were more punctilious, operating on the theory that
the copyright was a special legislative privilege that could be secured only through
full compliance with formalities. Although a notice accompanying the masthead of
a periodical (typically on the editorial page of a newspaper) was commonly
regarded as satisfactory, it was, for example, held that it was improper to place the
copyright notice on the back cover of a twenty-eight-page pamphlet; such a defect
was regarded as fatal, and the work was thrust into the public domain. 67 Similarly,
courts could be strict about the placement of the notice on a journal or other
collective work, holding that such notice would not protect included works that
were authored by others and that did not carry a separate copyright notice. 68
Inaccuracies in the year placed in the notice could also be fatal to the copyright.
The general rule that developed, through judicial decisions and Copyright Office
regulations, was that an inaccurately early date was not fatal, but the beginning of
the statutory term would be reckoned from that year (so as to shorten the term of
protection, for the benefit of the public). Notice that was postdatedby more than
one year (thus allowing for end-of-the-year slippage in publication schedules),
however, was regarded as fatally defective. Of course, if the required notice was
altogether omitted, that too was fatal. The statute itself, however, in section 20,
allowed one exception: when the copyright owner had "sought to comply" with the
notice provisions but "by accident or mistake" had omitted the notice "from a
particular copy or copies." 69 That oversight would not invalidate the copyright, but
would "prevent the recovery of damages against an innocent infringer who has
been misled by the omission of the notice." 70 Another issue that divided the courts
was whether U.S. copyright was lost, under the 1909 Act, when a work was first
published without a notice of copyright outside of the U.S. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has consistently since 1996 answered that question in the
negative.n
66. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 19, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079 (repealed 1976).
67. See J.A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, 23 F. Supp. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
68. See e.g., Sanga Music Inc. v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 55 F.3d 756, 760 (2d Cir. 1995).
69. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976).
70. This statutory exception, however, was held not to apply if the omission of notice was
through "neglect or oversight," Sieffv. Continental Auto Supply, 39 F. Supp. 683, 688 (D. Minn. 1941),
or through a mistake of law, Wildman v. New York Times Co., 42 F. Supp. 412,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
71. See, e.g., Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996). in Twin
Books, the literary work, Bambi, A Life in the Woods, was first published without notice in Germany in
1923, and then republished with notice in 1926 (and registered for U.S. copyright). The copyright
owner renewed the copyright in 1954, which would have been too late had the work's first publication
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In sum, while the notice formality marked the dividing line between protected
and public domain works, inconsistencies in its application blurred the boundary.
Moreover, the willingness of some courts to accept "substantial compliance" may
have achieved individually just results at the cost of systemic unpredictability.
3. Deposit and Registration
Under the 1909 Act, registration was not a prerequisite to federal protection during
the initial 28-year term of copyright, although it was necessary to have registered the
72
On the other
work and deposited copies before bringing an infringement action.
hand, section 13 of the Act required that copies of the work be deposited "promptly"
following publication, thus posing the question of whether failure to deposit copies
shortly after publication would strip the author or rights owner of the copyright that
would have vested upon publication with notice. It was ultimately held, however,
that failure promptly to deposit copies did not divest the copyright but would bar the
rights holder from bringing suit until deposit was made.n
While not initially constitutive of copyright, registration was a prerequisite to
obtaining a second statutory term of 28 years. The renewal term could be claimed by
the author if he or she survived the initial term (or at least until the date in the 28th
year when renewal was sought). If the author had died, then the right to claim the
renewal passed successively to three other statutory beneficiaries-the surviving
spouse or children, or for lack of those the author's executor, or in the absence of a
will the author's next of kin. The renewal term came into being only if an initial
application for registration, and then an application for renewal registration, was filed
with the Copyright Office. The registration prerequisite to renewal had the effect of
limiting the duration of most copyrights to 28 years. 74 Most non-renewals probably
reflected the rights owners' determinations that the works no longer had commercial
value justifying the effort and expense of renewal, but some non-renewals likely
resulted from failure to keep track of when renewal was due, or from other
inadvertence or ignorance. 75 Thus, the renewal formality ensured early entry into the
been in 1923. The court noted some early decisions which indicated that publication abroad without
notice forfeits the possibility of securing copyright through a later U.S. publication, but the court
concluded that such a view conflicted with the prevailing doctrine of "territoriality" of the copyright
law. The Ninth Circuit relied upon Heim v. UniversalPictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946), for the
proposition that publication abroad without notice-in a nation that does not place the work in the public
domain for that reason-will not prevent subsequently obtaining a valid U.S. copyright. The Ninth
Circuit has recently reasserted its adherence to Twin Books, see Succession Guino v. Renoir, 549 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 2008) (sculptures published in France without copyright notice in 1917 and 1974).
72. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (repealed 1976).
73. Pearson v. Washingtonian Pub. Co., 98 F.2d 245, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1938), rev'd, 306 U.S. 30
(1939).
74. See Barbara A. Ringer, Study No. 31, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT,
supranote 4.
75. See, e.g., Statement on the floor of the House of Representatives in connection with the
Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (substituting the equivalent of a
single seventy-five-year term for the prior dual terms, by making the second tem-twenty-eight plus
nineteen years-vest without filing for renewal: "The renewal requirements are highly technical and have
resulted in the unintended loss of valuable copyrights. In addition to countless individuals who do not
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public domain of the bulk of works initially protected for twenty-eight years, but at
the cost of divesting those authors (most likely, individual and foreign authors) who
may have wished protection but failed correctly to fulfill statutory requirements.
B.

INTERLUDE: 1925 BILL TO AMEND THE U.S. COPYRIGHT ACT TO JOIN THE
BERNE CONVENTION

The U.S. stance on formalities long precluded its membership in the Berne
Convention. During the 1920s, the efforts of the then-Register of Copyrights
Thorvald Solberg and of the Authors League and the American Society of
Composers Authors and Publishers, led to a 1925 bill "To amend and consolidate
the acts respecting copyright and to permit the United States to enter the
International Copyright Union." 76 The cornerstone of this bill was the automatic,
formality-free vesting of copyright upon creation of the work. Its advocates
characterized the then-current law's obligation to comply exactly with technical
requirements as a "rather primitive situation,"77 and as "restrictions on the
fundamental rights and privileges of the author and composer which should come
away."
The concept of automatic copyright, however, encountered considerable
skepticism from some lawmakers and fierce opposition from copyright-exploiting
industries, particularly the league of motion picture theaters and the producers of
phonograph records and piano rolls,79 for whom formalities combated expansive
assertions of authors' rights and formed a bulwark against unanticipated liability.
Some of the objections voiced against formality-free copyright seem drearily
prescient of the claims of today's "Copyleft." For example, Rep. William
Hammer, D-N.C., exclaimed, "Do you mean to chain human thought so that in this
free America, just by signing the author's name, an article can not be printed in a
newspaper without infringing upon a copyright? Is that the kind of law you are
asking us to enact?" 80 Similarly, the entrepreneurs of new technological modes of
exploitation then, as now, sanctimoniously strained to equate their profits with the
public interest. Thus the president of the association of Motion Picture Theater
have knowledge of the requirements, even famous directors such as Frank Capra have fallen victim.
Capra's It's a Wonderful Life, starring Jimmy Stewart and Donna Reed, went into the public domain
when the film production company that owned the copyright went bankrupt and no one was around to
file the renewal application."), reprintedin GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 54, at 423-24.
76. Copyright Act (Perkins Bill), H.R. 11258, 68th Cong. (2d Sess. 1925). The 1924 Dallinger
Bill proposed similar reforms.
77. Copyrights: HearingsPart I on H.R. 11258 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 14
(1925) (statement of Thorvald Solberg, Register of Copyrights).
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id. at 136-37 (statement of John G. Paine, Victor Talking Machine Co.) (proposed bill
"creates an undisclosed monopoly"); Copyrights: Hearings PartH on H.R. 11258 Before the H. Comm.
on Patents, 68th Cong. 227-84 (1925) (statement of Alfred L. Smith, Music Industries Chamber of
Commerce); Copyrights: HearingsPartIV on HR. 11258 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong.
(1925) (brief of Alfred L. Smith, Music Industries Chamber of Commerce) ("The sponsors of the
proposed legislation apparently have no concern for those members of the American public who would
thereby be subjected to great and unavoidable danger of infringement claims by foreigners.").
80. See Copyrights: HearingsPartI on H.R. 11258, supra note 77, at 68.
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Owners declared, "Congress ... should grant no copyright privilege which would
have any tendency to inhibit the activities or interfere with the progress of great
agencies like the motion-picture screen and the newspaper that are of such
81
consequence to the general welfare of the people of the United States."
It would take the U.S. another fifty years to adopt and (partially) implement the
Berne principle that exclusive and enforceable authors' rights arise with the
creation of the work. The toll of the earlier debates is apparent. Later reformers
recognized that Solberg's natural rights advocacy could not prevail in the intense
debates that defined copyright reform in the 1920s. 82 The Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the general revision of the U.S. Copyright Law that led to the 1976
Act did not endorse "automatic copyright." Proceeding from the general premise
that "where [the author's and the public's interests] conflict, the public interest
must prevail," the Register concluded that the notice requirement served the public
interest "by keeping free of copyright restrictions the great bulk of published
83
The Report
material in which the authors do not wish to secure copyright."
instead recommended retention of the notice requirement, but with a one-year grace
84
period for curing inadvertent omissions of notice from published copies of works.
C. FORMALITIES IN PRACTICE: THE 1976 ACT
The principal conceptual and practical innovation of the 1976 Act was to bring
published and unpublished works under a single federal regime, thus making
creation of a fixed copy of the work-rather than publication with notice-the
starting point for federal protection. But, while the 1976 Act was intended to bring
the U.S. closer to the Berne Convention,85 it did not at first fully adopt the postBerlin system of automatic, formality-free copyright. Rather, if copyright attached
upon creation and fixation of the work, it could detach-and the work fall into the
public domain-if the author upon publication failed to affix a notice of copyright,
and failed to cure that omission within the time period allowed by the statute.

81. Id. at 113. Some members of Congress seemed particularly unmoved by pretensions of this
kind, as in this colloquy between Mr. Paine and Rep. Hammer:
Mr. Paine. The position that we take is to come down here and urge this committee not to put
copyright users at the peril of making infringements of copyrighted works when they know
nothing about the copyrights.
Mr. Hammer. From a purely humanitarian standpoint of the pubic good, not your own private
interest?
Copyrights: HearingsPartI on H.R. 11258, supra note 79, at 296.
82. See Abe A. Goldman, Study No. 1, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901
to 1954, reprintedin 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1101, 1113 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed., 1963).
83.

See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.

COPYRIGHT LAW, ch. 1, reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 82, at 1206, 1263-64.
84. Id. at 1266-67.
85. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 135-36 (1976).
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1. Publication and Notice
Thus publication remained a key concept in U.S. copyright law, but the 1976
Act, unlike its predecessors, included a definition of publication. Section 101
defined publication as:
[T]he distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies
or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or
display of a work does not itself constitute publication. 86
This definition resolved many of the problems that arose by virtue of the
definitional vacuum in the 1909 Act, particularly by providing that a public
performance or display of a work is not a "publication" that entails a copyright
notice, but that the public distribution of phonograph records does constitute
publication of the recorded work (as well as of the sound recording). A definition
of publication clarified what acts triggered the notice obligation. For, despite the
United States' drawing closer to Berne, the 1976 Act retained a modified version of
the notice requirement. Among the issues most hotly debated during the
comprehensive revision of the 1909 Copyright Act leading up to the 1976 Act was
the continued imposition of a requirement to place copyright notice on "published"
works and the sanction for a failure to do so. Congress initially decided to retain
the notice requirement but to make less draconian the consequences of an error or
omission, in particular allowing for a five-year grace period for registration of the
work with the Copyright Office, and efforts to add notice to copies as a cure after
discovery of its omission.. This sort of difference-splitting between the Berne
system of automatic formality-free copyright and the conditional copyright of prior
U.S. enactments arguably served the goals of neither regime. A system of
defeasible copyright could not reliably alert potential users as to a work's public
domain status because absence of the notice from published copies no longer cast
the work immediately into the public domain; a user would have to wait five years
and interrogate registration records before being able to conclude that the work was

86. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
87. Nonetheless, the 1976 Act did not succeed in dispelling all confusion or uncertainty regarding
use of the notice. For example, almost seventy years after White-Smith Music Pub'g Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1 (1908), Congress still declined to equate recordings with copies. Thus, in this definition and
throughout the statute, one notes the refrain "copies or phonorecords." And, as will be noted below,
there is no provision for use of a D copyright notice on phonorecords pertaining to the underlying
recorded work. (There is a provision for a P notice pertaining to the recordedperformance under § 402.)
And, while the statute uses "copies" and "phonorecords" in the plural, the committee reports state that
under this definition "a work is 'published' if one or more copies or phonorecords embodying it are
distributed to the public." S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 121 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 138 (1976)
(emphasis added). But Chairman Kastenmeier of the House subcommittee stated on the House Floor
that "in the case of a work of art, such as a painting or statue, that exists in only one copy ... [i]t is not
the committee's intention that such a work should be regarded as 'published' when the single existing
copy is sold or offered for sale in the traditional way-for example, through an art dealer, gallery, or
auction house." 122 CONG. REc. 31,980 (1976).
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no longer under copyright. But, the system could still penalize authors who
neglected the notice and then failed to make timely registration by divesting them
of their copyrights after five years.
The notice requirements were set forth in §§ 401 and 402 of the 1976 Act. Section
401 applied to "copies" of published works, and § 402 to "phonorecords." In 1988,
in order to permit U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention, Congress eliminated the
copyright notice as a precondition to copyright protection. Nonetheless, in part
because it was difficult to break with such a longstanding practice as the use of
copyright notice-and in part because Congress and the Copyright Office continued
to believe that notice served useful purposes in warning unauthorized users and in
conveying information-the Berne Implementation amendments to the 1976 Act
continued to provide incentives to copyright owners to avail themselves of what has,
since March 1, 1989, become merely a discretionary option to use the notice on
published works.
After Berne adherence, the amended 1976 Act provided that, for works first
published on or after March 1, 1989-and also for copies or phonorecords
distributed after that date of works that had been published previously-§§ 401(a)
and 402(a) no longer require placement of notice on publicly distributed copies and
phonorecords, but instead provide that the 0 notice "may" be placed on copies and
the P-in-a-circle notice "may" be placed on phonorecords of sound recordings.88
The form and placement of the optional notice are the same as they were when the
notice was mandated. 89 The incentive provided for use of the notice was set forth
in a new subsection (d) to §§ 401 and 402, which disallow an innocent
infringement defense if the requisite notice "appears on the published copy [or
phonorecord] or copies [or phonorecords] to which a defendant in a copyright
infringement suit had access." 90 The incentive is rather weak, however, because
the innocent infringer defense applies only to the calculus of statutory damages; it
affects neither actual damages nor the existence of liability.91
The question has arisen whether the copy "to which a defendant ... had access"
means the source copy for the infringing act, or generally available copies, whether
or not such a copy was the one from which the defendant copied. In BMG Music v

88. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a) (2006).
89. Under § 404(a), a notice of copyright applicable to a collective work as a whole suffices as
notice for the separately-owned contents of the collective work, although the authors or copyright
owners of these contributions may also affix separate notices. Section 404 carries over the practice of
"blanket notice" which courts have held preserved the copyrights in contributions to collective works
published under the 1909 Copyright Act. See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that blanket notice "is sufficient to obtain a valid copyright on behalf of the beneficial
owner, the author or proprietor" under the 1909 Act (quoting Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
425 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1970))), affd sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
90. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d) (2006). As to whether continued use of the notice may be
expected once no meaningful sanctions attach to its omission, see H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 26-27
(1988) ("It is entirely possible that elimination of the notice formality may not in the end curtail its use.
Old habits die hard; it remains useful under the Universal Copyright Convention; and, it is, in all
probability, the cheapest deterrent to infringement which a copyright holder may take.").
91. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 504(c)(2) (2006).
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Gonzalez, the defendant downloaded numerous recorded songs from the Internet. 92
She sought a diminution of statutory damages on the ground that the copies from
which she copied did not bear a copyright notice. Recognizing that unauthorized
source copies may often lack copyright notice or other copyright owner-identifying
indicia, the court rejected the defendant's contention:
It is undisputed that BMG Music gave copyright notice as required-"on the surface
of the phonorecord, or on the phonorecord label or container" (§ 402(c)). It is
likewise undisputed that Gonzalez had "access" to records and compact disks bearing
the proper notice. She downloaded data rather than discs, and the data lacked
copyright notices, but the statutory question is whether "access" to legitimate works
was available rather than whether infringers earlier in the chain attached copyright
notices to the pirated works. Gonzalez readily could have learned, had she inquired,
that the music was under copyright. 93
It is important to remember that the Berne Implementation amendments
concerning notice do not apply retroactively. Thus, as to copies or phonorecords
first distributed before the amendments' effective date of March 1, 1989, one must
still ascertain whether notice was properly affixed. With respect to copies
distributed without notice between 1978 and February 1989 (inclusive), it is
necessary to determine whether the omission was discovered and cured within five
years of initial publication, and whether the copyright owner made reasonable
efforts to add notice to subsequently-distributed copies. 94
2. Deposit and Registration
Sections 407 through 412 of the 1976 Act enact a modernized administrative
scheme with the dual purpose of enriching the resources of the Library of Congress
and providing a comprehensive record of copyright claims. The former is achieved
in § 407, which prescribes a mandatory system of deposit as to published works for
Library purposes with administrative flexibility for implementation and realistic
sanctions for non-compliance under § 407(d) (not including forfeiture of
copyright). 95 The latter is embodied in a "permissive" registration provision,
§ 408.96 The Library deposit under § 407 may do double duty as the deposit
required for registration under § 408.97 Moreover, the incentives for registration
are quite strong. Accordingly, the dichotomy between these two deposit provisions
may not be quite as sharp as initially thought.

92. 430 F.3d. 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 892.
94. See, e.g., Gamier v. Andin Int'l, Inc., 36 F.3d 1214 (1st Cir. 1994). By virtue of § 104A,
however, the copyrights in foreign works published without notice before 1989 were restored, effective
January 1, 1996.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).
96. Id. § 408.
97. Id.
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a. Depositfor Library of Congress
The § 407 deposit, which "shall" be made by "the owner of copyright or of the
exclusive right of publication" within three months after publication in the United
States, is to consist of "two complete copies of the best edition" or, "if the work is a
sound recording, two complete phonorecords of the best edition," together with all
accompanying printed material. 98 The term "best edition" is defined in § 101 as
"the edition, published in the United States at any time before the date of deposit,
that the Library of Congress determines to be most suitable for its purposes." 99
The Library has issued a policy statement on what constitutes such a "best edition,"
and this is now referred to in the implementing Copyright Office regulations. 100
The material for use or disposition of the Library of Congress under § 407(b) of
the 1976 Act is to be deposited in the Copyright Office. Section 407(c) gives the
Register of Copyrights authority to issue regulations exempting categories of
material from the deposit requirements of this section, reducing the required copies
or phonorecords to one, or, in the case of certain pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, providing for exemptions or alternative forms of deposit. 10 1 The Register is
also empowered, under § 408(c), to specify classes of works for purposes of deposit
and to permit the deposit of "identifying material instead of copies or
phonorecords."l 02
b. Registration
i. Procedure
Registration under § 408 contrasts with the Library deposit provision under
§ 407 in the following respects: (1) it may be made not only by the owner of
copyright but also the owner of any exclusive right thereunder rather than by the
owner of the exclusive right of publication; (2) it applies to unpublished as well as
published works; (3) it includes works published abroad; and (4) it may be made
"at any time" during the subsistence of copyright. 03 If the Library deposit under
§ 407 is accompanied by a prescribed application for registration along with a fee
(currently $35 for an electronic filing and $65 for a paper filing for most works), it
may be used to satisfy the deposit requirements of registration.1 04 The deposit
copy must in most cases be a copy of the work in which copyright is claimed. 05
98. Id. § 407(a)(1), (2)
99. Id. § 101.
100. See 37 C.F.R. 202.19(b)(1) & app. B. The deposit requirement was sustained against a
variety of constitutional attacks in Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1985).
101. Id. § 407(c).
102. Id. 408(c).
103. Id. § 408.
Go

104. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED COPYRIGHT FEE ADJUSTMENTS TO
at
(2009),
available
AUGUST
1,
2009
OR
ABOUT
INTO
EFFECT
ON

http://www.copyright.gov/reports/fees2009.pdf.
105. See Coles v. Wonder, 283 F.3d 798, 801 (6th Cir. 2002) (1990 registration of 1982 song was
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The application for registration includes various items of information potentially
required for computation of duration (e.g., year of death, year of creation and year
of publication if any), as well as the basis of ownership for persons other than
authors and a brief, general statement of preexisting and added material used in any
derivative work or compilation. 106
ii. Effect of Registration
Although the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 had as one of its
objectives the elimination of the need to comply with statutory formalities, its
principal focus was upon the elimination of the notice requirement for published
works; it made few changes in the sections on deposit and registrationas they were
written in the 1976 Act. The major change in this respect is that registration of
copyright is no longer a prerequisite to an action for infringement of copyright "in
07
Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United States."
Most pertinently, this means that registration remains a prerequisite for an
infringement action when the copyrighted work is first published in the United
States or when the work, if unpublished, is by a U.S. author. 108 The 1988 Act thus
creates what is known as a two-tier registration system, with works of U.S. origin
being on the "lower" tier for purposes of litigation. 0 9 The requirement of pre-suit
registration has been criticized, both because of the inferior position in which it
places U.S. authors compared to foreign authors and because it is not clear that the
requirement in fact induces a substantial number of incremental registrations. 110
In addition to seeking to encourage registration through the pre-suit requirement,
the 1976 Act provided the following further incentives for timely registration: (1)
invalid when the deposited copy was a "reconstruction" of the song from memory and without direct
reference to the original; defendant is therefore awarded summary judgment, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
For certain types of works, it is permissible to deposit "identifying material" in lieu of a copy
of the work. 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.20-202.21 (2009).
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2006).
107. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Title 17 of the United States Code).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) ("[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title."). The Second Circuit has rejected an attempt to devise a "blanket registration" doctrine
akin to the "blanket notice" of § 404(a) (see supra note 89), under which the registration of a copyright
claim in a collective work would have covered the separate contents of the collective work as well. See
Morris v. Business Concepts, Inc., 283 F.3d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 2002).
109. For an unsuccessful attempt to extend the pre-suit registration requirement to foreign works
first published on a non-U.S. website, on the ground that publication on the Internet occurs
simultaneously in every country in which the work is accessible, thus rendering the work a "United
States work" subject to § 411, see Moberg v. Leygues, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009) (rejecting
simultaneous publication theory as contrary to the Berne Convention and U.S. copyright law).
I 10. See Robert Wedgeworth & Barbara Ringer, The Library of Congress Advisory Committee on
Copyright Registration and Deposit-Letter and Report of the Co-Chairs, 17 COLUM.-VLA J. L. &
ARTs 271, 310 (1993) ("One thing on which all of the members of ACCORD appeared to agree was the
lack of hard evidence concerning the effect of sections 411(a) and 412 as inducements to registration.");
id. at 272 ("[N]o empirical proof that these [three] sections induce registration.").
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registration within five years of first publication will ensure prima facie proof of
validity of the copyright1 1 ' and (2) statutory damages and attorneys fees may be
awarded only if registration is made prior to the commencement of the
infringement. 112 Given the high costs of litigation, this last incentive is crucial and
indeed, for smaller litigants, may determine whether bringing an infringement
action is financially viable. It is important to emphasize that these incentives apply
to all works regardless of their countries of origin. As a practical matter, then,
copyright registration promptly upon publication remains key to effective
enforcement of copyright, even for non-U.S. works for which registration is not a
prerequisite to suit. 113
Whether or not they in fact increase the numbers of works registered, the
registration incentives thus achieve a gatekeeper function, forestalling the claims of
litigants, many of whom are likely to be individual authors. As Pamela Samuelson
and Tara Wheatley have observed:
The prompt registration requirement for statutory damages has not become a
meaningful inducement to registration for all authors who value copyright protection,
but rather a substantial boon to major copyright industry players-the commercial
exploiters of copyrighted works whose rights largely derive from the Act's work for
hire rules or assignments from authors . . . . "Little guy" authors thus, in theory, have
the same strong legal rights as major copyright industry players, but effectively no
way to get relief when their rights are infringed. 114
Nonetheless, this filtering of small claimants may not always prove a boon to the
larger economic actors who may perceive the pre-suit requirement and limitations
on statutory damages and attorneys fees as desirable means of screening out

111.
17 U.S.C. §410(c) (2006).
112. Id. § 412. This provision makes these remedies available even as to post-publication
infringements that commence before registration if the latter is made within three months after first
publication.
113. A related question, receiving sparse but contradictory treatment from courts, is how closely
the work registered must correspond to the work allegedly infringed. Compare Streetwise Maps, Inc. v.
VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 746-47 (2d Cir. 1998) (copyright registration of derivative work sufficient
for copyright infringement action based on pre-existing work where plaintiff owned copyrights for both
derivative and pre-existing work), R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th
Cir. 2009) (citing Streetwise for same proposition), and Christopher Phelps & Assoc., LLC v. Galloway,
492 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that registration of architectural design is sufficient to
provide standing for suit for "entire design," including underlying, pre-existing, and unregistered aspects
of design), with Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2003)
(registration of a claim on a pre-existing work does not confer jurisdiction over infringement claims
regarding its derivative works). But see Scholz Design, Inc. v. Zimmerman, No. DKC 08-1759, 2009
WL 2226048, at *3-*4 (D. Md. Jul. 22, 2009) (registration of underlying architectural design does not
cover claim alleging infringement of derivative work design). See also Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d
591 (9th Cir. 2003) (musical composition defined by deposit copy of musical score, rather than by
recorded performance of the work which, if set in musical notation, would have included more notes);
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) (claim of violation of
architectural work rejected when registration was made in category of pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works); supra note 105 (discussing Coles v. Wonder).
114. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in
Need ofReform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439,454-55 (2009).
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frivolous claims."' For example, in a case involving the unauthorized digitization
of the works of freelance journalists by the periodicals in which they had published
their work, the Second Circuit had held that the § 411 requirement that "registration
of the copyright claim ha[ve] been made" before instituting an infringement action
is "jurisdictional," and that the court therefore did not have authority to approve a
class action settlement which included compensation to authors of works whose
authors had not registered them with the Copyright Office." 6 Had the Supreme
Court not reversed the Second Circuit's characterization of the pre-suit registration
requirement as "jurisdictional," the large newspaper and magazine publisher
defendants in that case would have faced the prospect of additional liability for
copyright infringement should the excluded class members subsequently register
their works and resume the litigation." 7
The statutory language requiring pre-suit registration, or its literal interpretation,
produces other undesirable results as well. For example, some courts have held
that an author may not bring an infringement action until the registration in fact
issues or is definitively refused by the Copyright Office." 8 As a result, an author
who promptly filed an application for registration, but the determination of whose
application falls prey to backlogs in the Copyright Office, may not have her claims
adjudicated until the Copyright Office acts on the application."' 9 Where the author

115. See, e.g., Wedgeworth & Ringer, supra note 110, at 293 (fear that elimination of registration
prerequisite to statutory damages and attorneys fees will engender "a flood of infringement claims").
See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 23, Reed
Elsevier v. Muchnick, No. 08-103 (filed June 2009) (registration requirement may filter out bad claims:
"[T]he registration requirement may sometimes obviate the need for the court to rule on infringement
claims at all, since a potential plaintiff whose registration application is denied by the Copyright Office
may forgo suit rather than challenge the Register's determination.").
116. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006); In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation,
509 F.3d 116, 121-25 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, No. 08-103, 2010
U.S. LEXIS 2202 (Mar. 2,2010).
117. The Second Circuit's decision also appears to have inspired a particularly perverse
interpretation of § 411 as barring an action for a declaration of non-infringement if the work at issue has
not been registered for copyright. See Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Res., Inc., 542 F.3d
859, 863 (11th Cir. 2008).
While registration is a prerequisite to a suit for copyright infringement of a U.S. work,
non-registration or improper registration does not prevent an action alleging violation of the § 1201
provisions prohibiting circumvention of technological measures that protect access to or prevent copying
of a copyrighted work. See, e.g., I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
521, 530 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
118. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005);
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Strategy Source, Inc. v.
Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002); Do Denim, LLC v. Fried Denim, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 403
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). But see Tri Mktg., Inc. v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. 09-13, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42694, at *10 (D. Minn. May 19, 2009) (holding jurisdictional requirement met upon submission
of application).
119. In 2005, Congress amended the registration provisions to add Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 408(f),
119 Stat. 218, 221 (2005), allowing for "Preregistration of works being prepared for commercial
distribution." The provision assists enforcement of copyright in a "class of works that the Register
determines has had a history of infringement prior to authorized commercial distribution." Id. This
class consists of motion pictures, sound recordings, musical compositions, literary works being prepared
for publication in book form, computer programs (including videogames), or advertising or marketing
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has in fact sought to make the requisite public record of her claim, it is unclear
what public policy such a wooden approach, whether it be Congress' or the courts',
to registration advances.

iii. Registrationand Renewal of Copyright
While works created as of the January 1, 1978 effective date of the 1976
Copyright Act enjoy a unitary term of the life of the author plus (since 1998)
seventy years (or, for works made for hire, anonymous or pseudonymous works,
now ninety-five years from first publication), works first published under the 1909
Act come within a transitional regime. The 1976 Act initially preserved the
renewal requirement for all works then in their first term of copyright. Thus the
author of a work first published in 1960 would have had to register the work and
renew its registration in order to obtain the second term of protection. In 1992,
Congress provided for the automatic renewal of any work still in its first term; thus,
for works first published between 1964 and 1977, the author's failure to renew
120
would no longer cast the work into the public domain.
3. Recordation of Transfers
The principal purpose of the registration formality is to facilitate ascertaining the
copyright status and ownership of a work of authorship. Registration will aid titlesearching, however, only to the extent it also accounts for subsequent transfers of
ownership. Section 205(c) of the Copyright Act permits recordation of properly
executed documents, and accords constructive notice to the recorded facts if:
(1) the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it
pertains so that, after the document is indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would
be revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work;
and
(2) registration has been made for the work. 121
Section 205 offers a further encouragement to take measures enhancing the utility
of the Copyright Office's records: in the event of a conflict of transfers, the first to
record prevails. Section 205, however, no longer accompanies these carrots with a
photographs. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(b) (2008). The fee is $115 per work. 37 C.F.R § 201.3(c)(7)
(2009).
While it is possible to obtain rapid resolution of an application for registration, the expedited
procedure involves substantial additional expense: where the standard fee is $65 (or $35 for an online
filing), the fee for "special handling" is $760. 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.3(c)(2), 201.3(d). Where the
registration claim has been pending for at least six months, however, the Copyright Office will waive the
additional fee for "special handling." Fees for Special Handling of Registration Claims, 74 Fed. Reg.
39899, 39901 (Aug. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2) (2008). In Kahle v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
automatic renewal amendment against a challenge that Congress' abandonment of that copyrightconfiscatory formality altered the "traditional contours" of copyright in violation of the First
Amendment. 487 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2007).
17 U.S.C. § 205 (2006).
121.
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stick. In its original guise, § 205(d) of the 1976 Act made recordation a
prerequisite to suit, but in the Berne-adherence amendments Congress deleted that
The Berne-adherence amendments may in this instance have
requirement.
undermined one of the beneficial functions of formalities in a context in which the
22
requirement may not in fact have been Berne-incompatible.1
III. AUTHOR-FRIENDLY FORMAL REQUIREMENTS?
Formalities have benefits. If all works are protected, whether or not their
authors have asserted rights in them, then an untold number of works whose
authors neither maintain nor exploit them remain off limits to others' exploitation,
without profit to their creators. Arguably, if the creator cannot take care enough to
mark off her claims, then perhaps the public should be entitled to rely on the
absence of notice to treat the work as unclaimed and free. Law and economics
reasoning might reinforce this conclusion: The creator is better able to assume the
costs of notification than the public is to incur the costs of tracing rights holders.
And those search costs can be high, particularly if the work is old, or if rights have
been divided up among a variety of grantees (and their heirs). A system that
requires authors first to assert rights, through notice in distributed copies, or
registration in a publicly accessible record, alerts the world to the author's claims.
A system that obliges all transfers of rights to be recorded on the publicly
accessible record facilitates tracing rights holders.
Notice, registration and recordation of transfers thus are unquestionably
beneficial and desirable; the problem, and the historical difference between the
United States and much of the rest of the world, lies in the consequences of failure
to affix notice, register, or record a transfer of ownership. Confiscating the
copyrights of the non-compliant, or barring their way to the courthouse door, may
encourage adherence to formalities. 123 But not all those who fail to fulfill these
obligations do so because they do not care about their works. Some lose track;
some are ignorant of the obligation, particularly if they reside in foreign countries
which do not impose formalities; some may find the fees prohibitive. The last
point is not trivial, particularly for individual creators. Fees of $35 (for electronic
filings) to $65 (for paper filings) per work may not impose a significant financial
burden if the author creates relatively few works. For example, if the author

122. See discussion, supra Part I.A. Congress nevertheless was convinced that pre-suit recordation
was Berne-incompatible. S. REP. No. 100-352, at 26 (1988) ("The committee concludes that the
recordation requirement of section 205(d), at least as applied to foreign works originating in Berne
countries, is incompatible with the Berne prohibition against formalities as preconditions for the
'enjoyment and exercise' of copyright."). The conclusion, however, was a main point of contention in
consideration of the Act. Cf The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,100th Cong. 155
(1988) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights) (advocating for S. 1971, which did not
eliminate pre-suit registration or recordation requirements); H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 43-44 (1988)
("The [pre-suit recordation requirement] is Berne compatible because the failure to record does not lead
to loss of the copyright-it merely regulates who may sue.").
123. But see supra note I10.
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produces one novel every year or two, the registration fee would seem
unproblematic (and will in any event likely be paid by the publisher). But if the
author creates a large volume of works, for example, in the visual arts, the fees per
work quickly add up. The author who cannot afford to register all her works might
wait to see which of her works attracts an audience before selecting which to
register, but this strategy could prove perilous. Not only does the cost of
registration increase to $760 for an eve-of-litigation registration,1 24 but because
statutory damages and attorneys fees are available only with respect to works that
were registered within three months of publication, or before the infringement
occurred, the author who waits to see what succeeds (and infringement can be
evidence of success) will have lost the opportunity to obtain statutory damages and
attorneys fees, and therefore might find she cannot afford to bring the suit. 125
Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, whose understanding of U.S.
copyright formalities was second to none,126 proclaimed, regarding the registration
formality, "My philosophy has always been to reward authors for what they do, not
to punish them for what they don't do."' 27 To obtain the social benefits of
formalities without disadvantaging authors, it may be desirable to look beyond the
current copyright law and the Copyright Office to alternatives to demarcating the
public domain status of a work, and to establishing a traceable public record of
copyright claims. With respect to the former, under the default position of the
copyright law (and of the Berne Convention) an original work of authorship is
automatically protected; absence of notice or of registration does not entitle
members of the public to conclude that the work is freely appropriable. But if it is

124. See supra note 118.
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). The Copyright Office regulations allow registration of certain
works, for example, photographs published within twelve months of each other, as a group, for which
one fee will apply. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(10) (2008). But waiting until twelve months have elapsed
before registering the group may disqualify from statutory damages any photographs not registered
before the infringement occurred. It is, however, possible to register the photographs in three-month
batches (thereby also quadrupling the registration fees), thus taking advantage of the three-month grace
period if the infringement occurs soon after publication. Id. § 202.3(b)(10)(vi).
It also is not clear whether, when a work is registered as part of a group, the "work" for
purposes of calculating statutory damages, is the group or its individual components. If two works
within a group are infringed, then the characterization of "the work" will either double or halve the basis
for calculation of damages. For examples of courts grappling to sort out the relevant work(s) from a
group registration, see Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 & n.8 (1st Cir.
1993) ("We are unable to find any language in either the statute or the corresponding regulations that
precludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights in multiple works on a single registration
form while still collecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement of each work's copyright.
. . . the number of copyright registrations is not the unit of reference for determining the number of
awards of statutory damages."); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(assessing status as individual work by asking whether work could "'live [its] own copyright life')
(quoting Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976)).
126. See, e.g., Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 477 (1977). See also Wedgeworth & Ringer, supra note 110; Doyle, Cary, McCannon & Ringer,
supra note 47.
127. Judith Nierman, Barbara Ringer: 1925-2009, COPYRIGHT NOTICES (Copyright Office,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2009, at 5, available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/ barabara-ringerspecial-edition-2009-04.pdf
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no longer necessary to assert rights through notice or other formalities in order to
vest copyright, perhaps a formal relinquishment of rights might suffice to place a
work in the public domain (or at least to enable a court to conclude that the author
is estopped from enforcing her rights). Thus, an unambiguous notice, such as the
Creative Commons PD icon, might shift the default as to given works away from
protected status. The burden thus would not be on the author to acquire rights, but
rather to disclaim them.
With respect to rights clearance, the records of collective licensing societies, if
open to the public, offer another source of information. For works in digital
formats, rightholders may embed "copyright management information" identifying
the author and subsequent rightholders and setting out terms and conditions for
Section 1202 of the Copyright Act protects this
licenses or permissions.
information against removal or tampering, although the statutory scope of
128
The Creative Commons
protection has proved inadequate in several instances.
icons standardize certain kinds of copyright management information, marking off
the scope of rights granted or withheld.129 These markers perform a very useful
notice function, identifying both the author and, within a limited set of choices, the
nature of the uses permitted (commercial or non-commercial; whether or not
derivative works are authorized).1 30 The omnibus nature of a CC license, however,
makes it inappropriate for authors who wish to differentiate among licensees. Nor
do the licenses directly assist authors who would seek to be paid for the works they
distribute using the icons, because Creative Commons does not currently
incorporate a payment mechanism. On the other hand, an author's selection of the
"non-commercial" license could be understood as an invitation to bargain with the
author for the right to exploit the work commercially.131
Real improvements in title searching may well require amending the Copyright
Act (with all the perils that entails) in at least three respects. First, the author's
name should normally furnish the best starting point for ascertaining copyright
ownership, particularly if no publicly accessible registry includes a given work's
first or subsequent copyright owner. 132 Effective title searching then depends on

128. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999), affid., 336 F.3d
811 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to protect information about authorship, terms and conditions for
exploiting work because plaintiff had not embedded the copyright management information in the images
themselves, but had included it elsewhere on his webpages); Gordon v. Nextel Comms., 345 F.3d 922 (6th
Cir. 2003) (failure to prove that removal of copyright notice was intentional and intended to facilitate
infringement); Jacobsen v Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115204, at *20-21 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2009) (Defendants removed names of the authors and copyright holder, title, reference to
license, where to find the license and the copyright notices; renamed the files; and referred to their own
copyright notice and named themselves as author and copyright owner. While the information was
protectable under § 1202, facts alleged did not suffice to prove defendants' knowledge and intent).
129. CreativeCommons.org, License Your Work, http://creativecommons.org/choose/ (last visited
Mar. 6,2010).
130. Id.
131. Thanks to Prof. Jessica Litman for this observation.
132. Cf Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 15(1), July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 ("In order that the author of a literary or artistic work protected
by this Convention shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be regarded as such, and consequently
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the work's disclosure of the author's name. This may seem an obvious point, but
appearances mislead; the point's obviousness is premised on the expectation that
the author's name will in fact appear in connection with her work. Or put another
way, that the author enjoys an enforceable right of attribution. In fact, outside the
narrow realm of certain works of visual art, the U.S. Copyright Act does not give
authors the right to name recognition. 133 And it seems that other federal or state
sources (other than contracts) afford authors no recourse either.134 Thus, Congress
should include a general right of authorship attribution in the Copyright Act. 135
Second, we need a reliable record of transfers of copyright interests. Congress
might consider enacting a variety of incentives. Were Congress to reimpose a presuit recordation requirement, that amendment should not violate the Berne
Convention, because, as discussed earlier, a filing obligation that addresses who
owns a copyright, rather than whether a copyright exists or may be enforced is not
a prohibited "formality" in the sense of that treaty.136 Arguably, barring the
courthouse door to the copyright grantee does make the right unenforceable
because anyone else is a stranger to the right, and therefore no one else can enforce
it. But the Copyright Act already provides one solution to that impasse: a
"beneficial" copyright owner, for example, an author who transferred rights in
return for royalties, has standing to bring an infringement action. 137 On the other
hand, an author who does not retain a continuing royalty interest might not be a
"beneficial owner," and therefore could lack standing.1 38 Congress could provide a
be entitled to institute infringement proceedings in the countries of the Union, it shall be sufficient for
his name to appear on the work in the usual manner. This paragraph shall be applicable even if this
name is a pseudonym, where the pseudonym adopted by the author leaves no doubt as to his identity.").
See also Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform 34 (U. of Michigan Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 09-018, U. of Michigan Pub. Law Working Paper No. 168), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1474929 ("In a world of media conglomerates who
purchase each other's divisions, spin off product lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying rate, an
author is now far easier to track down than her assorted assignees, their successors and their respective
assignees. It also seems more likely that an author will have kept track of what publisher bought her
publisher than that a publisher will know how to find all of the authors whose contracts it assumed when
it purchased the company that purchased the company that initially held the author's contracts.").
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (attribution rights in narrowly-defined "work ofvisual art").
134. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademarks Law, 41 HOus. L. REv. 263 (2005) (surveying sources of attribution rights and proposing
amendment to the Copyright Act).
135. For details of a proposed attribution right, see, e.g., id.; Justin Hughes, American Moral
Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap, " 2007 UTAH L. REv. 659, 699-703 (2007). Contra Rebecca
Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 789 (2007).
136. See supra,part IA.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
138. See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (considering basic example of
beneficial owner as "an author who had parted with legal title to the copyright in exchange for
percentage royalties based on sales or license fees" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976),
reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5775). But see Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136,
1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that grant of royalties to creator of work-for-hire does not create beneficial
ownership). Perhaps, however, the author's inalienable termination right under § 203 might constitute
sufficient continuing economic interest to qualify the author as a beneficial owner. But cf Hearn v.
Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding merely possible reversion of royalty interest
insufficient to create beneficial ownership).
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more radical solution to incentivize recordation: any exclusive rights that are
transferred but not recorded within a stated period will revert to their grantors.
Requiring recordation as a prerequisite to suit, or indeed, as a condition of the
validity of the grant,139 will, however, only assist title-searching to the extent that
the recordation documents clearly define the scope of the grant of rights. Thus, as a
corollary to a reinforced recordation obligation, Congress might further provide
that any ambiguities in the scope of the recorded grant will be interpreted against
the grantee.
Third, returning to the Copyright Office, while a central public register ideally
should be the best, most complete source of information about the existence and
ownership of copyrights, problems of practical implementation and of fairness to
individual authors and smaller copyright owners caution against tying meaningful
copyright enforcement to copyright registration. 140 On the other hand, while presuit or pre-infringement registration requirements should therefore be eliminated,
registration should be encouraged, notably because the recordation system here
advocated depends on initial registration of the work in which rights are assigned or
licensed. For individual creators of large volumes of works for whom separate
registrations become cumulatively prohibitive, one might consider establishment of
annual registration accounts into which authors would prepay a substantially
discounted blanket fee covering the year's production so that each individual work
upon publication could be registered without further payment. The accounts would
work like employee "flexible spending accounts": at the start of the year, the
author would pay in a sum which she believes will, at the discounted rate, cover the
number of works she expects to register in the course of the year. If she exhausts
the deposited sum, she would pay additional fees for additional works; in order to
avoid discouraging the registration of the additional works, the fees should still
reflect the discount. If she in fact registers fewer works than anticipated, the
Copyright Office would keep the difference.
An efficient registration system may provide its own best incentive, but we are
not likely to enjoy such a centralized system unless it is adequately staffed and
supported by government funding. Congressional intent to encourage registration
must be implemented through efficient and low-cost procedures that will enable the
Copyright Office to process promptly all the applications whose registration U.S.
public policy purports to favor. At the moment, when the waiting time between
filing for and issuance of a registration exceeds eighteen months for a paper
filing, 14 1 and averages six months for an electronic filing, 142 if substantially more
139. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006) (transfer of copyright ownership must be in writing and signed
by the grantor).
140. Arguably one person's "fairness to individual authors" is another's "encouragement of strike
suits," but there should be means, other than making lawsuits unaffordable for valid claimants, to
discourage frivolous claims, such as the award of attorneys fees against the losing plaintiff. See 17
U.S.C. § 505 (2006) (providing court may award costs and attorneys fees to prevailing party).
141. See Lindsey Layton, 0 2009? Wishful Thinking, Perhaps,as Backlog Mounts, WASH. POST,
May 19, 2009, at A7 If electronic filings displace paper filings, the paper filing backlog may diminish.
142. Copyright
Office,
Online
Services
(eCO
Electronic
Copyright
Office),
http://www.copyright.gov/register/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). But see Copyright Office, Frequently
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creators of works of authorship in fact sought to register them than do now, the
already backlogged Copyright Office might well be incapable of handling them.
Changing the registration system from one based on examination to an
automatic repository of claims might reduce backlog, but it is not clear that this
kind of streamlining would in fact improve the system. Because the originality
threshold for copyrightability is very low,1 43 and the Copyright Office in fact
registers the overwhelming majority of claims,144 one might contend that little
would be lost, and time would be gained, were Congress to discard the
examination. If in fact the backlog were attributable to time copyright examiners
spend ascertaining the originality of the works for which registration is sought, the
proposal might be compelling, especially if in most cases minimal originality were
apparent. But it appears that examiners spend the bulk of their time addressing
other aspects of the applications, particularly the internal consistency of the
information the applicant supplied and its conformity with the information
requested by the form.145 In other words, examiners devote most of their time to
verifying that the applications establish a reliable public record of the claim and
claimants. 146
The examination justifies the Copyright Act's provision that makes registration
within five years of first publication "constitute prima facie evidence of the validity
of the copyright." 47 Prima facie validity serves at least two functions. First, it
places the burden on the defendant to disprove the work's originality or the
accuracy of the other information, such as the date of the work's creation. The
practical significance of this function depends on whether the allocation of the
burden to the defendant in fact changes the outcome when originality is in
dispute.1 48 If courts in effect address originality de novo, the evidentiary
Asked Questions, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#certificate (last visited Feb. 25,
2010) (estimating closer to nine-month waiting time).
143. A "modicum of creativity" will suffice. See FeistPubl'ns,, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc.,
499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). The standard of creativity for obtaining a patent is much higher, and requires
substantive expertise on the part of the examiners. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (novelty); id. § 103
(nonobviousness).
144.

See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 11

(2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2007/ar2007.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2010) ("During fiscal year 2007, the Copyright Office received 541,212 claims to copyright covering
well over a million works and registered 526,378 claims .... .").
145.

DONALD W. KING, ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF U.S. COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES FINAL

REPORT 34-35 (1986) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS] (distinguishing a thorough examination
that delves deeply into originality and novelty from a "cursory examination to determine only that all
technical requirements are carried out" and implying that the Copyright Office system tends toward the
latter, in that it "does not generally examine works for artistic merit or newness, nor . . . does it
examine' works to determine if the work is in fact an 'original' work").
146. Id. at 30 (emphasizing registration as means of providing "useful information to the public"
and noting the Copyright Office's "complete historical file, dating back to the first registration made at
the office in 1870").
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006). Section 401(a) makes clear that the registration's prima facie
value as to the copyrightability of the subject matter and validity of the information contained in the
registration results from the examination process. Id. § 401(a).
148. Compare Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992(WHP), 2002 WL 485730, at *7-8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) (establishing lack of originality, despite plaintiff's registration for his "Black

348

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[33:3

advantages of registration would lie principally with respect to proof of dates of
creation and publication; in cases where the dates of creation or dissemination of
plaintiffs and defendant's works are at issue, assignment of the burden of proof
can make a difference. 149
The second function of presumptive validity may carry even more practical
consequences. A cease-and-desist letter to which a copy of a registration is
appended may be far more effective than an unaccompanied demand.so The
registration represents a government determination that the work in question
crosses the threshold of copyrightability and that the author is the initial copyright
owner. If the registration were simply an unverified record of the author's
assertions, it is not clear that it would provide admonitory benefits. Thus, even
were registration no longer a prerequisite to statutory damages and attorneys fees,
authors (as well as the general public) still would be better served by a credible
public record of their works than without one. Voluntary compliance with
formalities accordingly promotes the interests of both authors and their audiences.
But, without a smoothly-functioning registration system, the current U.S. system of
de facto mandatory formalities simply penalizes authors without sufficiently
advancing the public record.

Bat" allegedly infringed by DC Comics' Batman), and Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp.
1435, 1440-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (establishing lack of originality, despite plaintiffs registration for his
foam hat of Statue of Liberty Crown allegedly infringed by defendant's foam hat of Statute of Liberty
Crown), with Stanislawski v. Jordan, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (appearing to give
significant weight to registration as evidence that plaintiffs works were not derivative), and Maljack
Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1428 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding "UAV's mere
supposition, unsupported by evidence, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of the
certificate of copyright").
149. See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d. Cir. 1997) (counterclaimant Andrew Lloyd
Webber asserted that plaintiff's song was copied from earlier song by Webber). See also COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS, supra note 145, at 105 (in 1986 study, in 80% of lawsuits, prima facie evidentiary value of
registration was found to be "very important" (59%) or "somewhat important" (21%) in settling or
terminating the lawsuit. "When prima facie evidence supplied by the copyright registration was
challenged, the challenge was not successful 83 percent of the time.").
150. Id. (in 71% of nonlitigated disputes, primafacie evidentiary value of registration was found
to be "very important" (46%) or "somewhat important" (25%) in resolving the dispute).

